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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PAM JOY REALTY,
a California corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 940662-CA

vs.
5900 Associates, L.C.,
a Utah limited liability
company, and John Does 1-10,
unknown individuals,

Priority No. 15

Defendants and Appellees

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant

to

Rule

24(c)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, plaintiff and appellant Pam Joy Realty replies to those
new matters raised by defendant and appellee, 5900 Associates,
regarding plaintiff's evidence of fraud and mistake.

ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFF HAS MET ITS BURDEN OF PRODUCING
EVIDENCE IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE.
In its motion for summary judgment and subsequent brief on
appeal, the defendant seeks to demonstrate that the plaintiff's
evidence is legally insufficient to establish its claims of fraud
and mistake as a matter of law.

Brief of Appellee at 10-26.

Defendant attempts to support this contention by attacking both the
nature and sufficiency of the statements contained in plaintiff's
counter-affidavit, and by requiring plaintiff to meet its "burden
of proof" by establishing its case at this stage of the proceedings
by clear and convincing evidence.

Brief of Appellee at 24-25.

In support of the latter position, defendant relies primarily
on this Court's decision in Andalex Resources. Inc. v. Myers. 871
P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994).

Brief of Appellee at 14.

In Andalex,

this Court essentially followed the federal approach to summary
judgment proceedings which requires trial judges to consider the
eventual standard of proof at trial before ruling these motions.
Id. at 1046-47.

See, e.g. . All West Pet Supply v. Hill's Pet

Products, 840 F. Supp. 1426, 1431-33, (D. Kan. 1993)(discussion of
different state and federal standards).

This approach was also

taken in Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292
(Utah App. 1994), which, however, held that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment against the plaintiff and appellant on
its fraud claim.

883 P.2d at 293.
2

According to this view, it is not enough for the nonmoving
party to establish the mere existence of genuine issues of material
fact by producing some evidence supporting each element of its
claim.

See, e.g. , Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041

(Utah App. 1994).

Rather, the nonmoving party has the additional

burden of providing sufficient evidence which, if assumed to be
true, would establish a prima facie case according to the standard
of proof applicable to a particular claim at trial, id.

As

succinctly stated in Republic:
In order to grant summary judgment on this
claim, the trial court had to determine that
Republic failed to supply evidence which, if
accepted
as
true, would
clearly
and
convincingly support each element of a fraud
claim.
883 P.2d at 292.
By contrast, it appears that the Utah Supreme Court continues
to adhere to the traditional view.

For example, in Ron Shepherd

Insurance, Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994), the Court
stated:
"Summary judgment allows the parties to pierce
the pleadings to determine whether a material
issue of fact exists that must be resolved by
the fact finder."

Lamb v.

B & B

Amusements

Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) (citing
Reagan Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. v. Lundgren,
692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984); Webster
v.
Sill,
675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983)). In
accordance with this rule, "[t]he party moving
for summary judgment must establish a right to
judgment based on the applicable law as
applied to an undisputed material issue of
fact. A party opposing the motion is
required
only to show that there is a material
issue of
fact."
Id.
(emphasis
added)(citations
omitted).
Moreover, as
to questions
concerning
material
issues
of
fact,
3

" [a]ffidavits and depositions submitted in
support of and in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment may be used only to determine
whether a material issue of fact exists, not
to determine whether one party's case is less
persuasive than another's or is not likely to
succeed in a trial on the merits."
Id.
Accordingly, M[b]ecause this is an appeal from
a summary judgment, we review the factual
submissions to the trial court in a light most
favorable to finding a material issue of

fact."

Versluis

v.

Guaranty

Nat' 1 Cos.,

842

P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992) (citing King
v.
Searle
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,
832 P.2d 858
(Utah 1992)). "A genuine issue of fact exists
where, on the basis of the facts in the
record, reasonable minds could differ" on any
material issue. Jackson
v. Dabney,
645 P. 2d
613, 615 (Utah 1982).
Id. at 654-55
In Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, a case involving the
clear and convincing evidence standard, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995),
the Court observed that:
In granting summary judgment, it is
apparent that the trial court gave more weight
to some affidavits than to others. This was
inappropriate at this stage of the litigation.
On a motion for summary judgment, a trial
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and
its sole inquiry should be whether material
issues of fact exist.
W.M. Barnes
Co.
v.
Sohio
Nat'l
Resources
Co.,
627 P. 2d 56, 59
(Utah 1981).
Id. at 1100.
In this case, defendant moved for summary judgment before
filing an answer or engaging in any discovery.

It now attempts to

demonstrate that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of proof
by improperly weighing the evidence.

In Appellee's brief, for

example, the following assertion is made:

4

This is not a case of which party can be
most persuasive in convincing a fact finder
whether a mistake was or was not made. It is
a case of meeting one's burden of proof. It
is a case of whether plaintiff — as a matter
of law — can establish that its case is so
clear that there could be no substantial
doubt. It is defendant's position, in light
of the affirmative affidavit of Briggs; the
existence of two written contracts; the clear
and unambiguous language of the contracts; the
second opportunity of plaintiff to correct any
mistake; the lack of materiality and/or
prejudice; and the vagueness, as well as the
hearsay
nature
of
plaintiff's
opposing
affidavit, that reasonable minds could simply
never conclude that plaintiff's position is so
clear and convincing that it is without doubt
as to its correctness.
Brief of Appellee at 24-25.

Such an approach literally leads to a

trial by affidavit in contravention of the purpose and intent of
summary judgment proceedings.

See Draper City. 888 P.2d at 1100.
II.

PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE OF FRAUD IS LEGALLY
SUFFICIENT TO WITHSTAND DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .
Plaintiff and defendant agree that under Utah law, the well
established elements of fraud are:
(1)

A representation;

(2)

Of a presently existing fact;

(3)

Which was false;

(4)

Which the representor either knew to be false or
made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge on which to base such representation;

(5)

For the purpose of inducing the other party to act
upon it;
5

Dugan v.

(6)

And the other party acted reasonably;

(7)

And did in fact rely upon it;

(8)

And was thereby induced to act;

(9)

And was damaged.

Jones, 615

P.2d

1239, 1246

(Utah

1980).

Defendant

contends, however, that sufficient evidence of elements (2), (4),
(6), and (9) is lacking.

Plaintiff contends that it has met its

burden of producing legally sufficient evidence on each element to
withstand a motion for summary judgment.
A.

Evidence of Representation of Presently Existing Facts.

In it's brief on appeal, plaintiff identified seven specific
misrepresentations of material facts by defendant's agent Barlow
Briggs.

Brief of Appellant at 19-20.

to only two of them.
1.

Defendant elected to respond

Brief of Appellee at 11-14.

Re-roofing Issue

The first issue involves disputed facts about the extent of
the work on the roof.

Plaintiff contends that it was told the

entire building had been re-roofed.

Smalley Aff. 1 6.

Defendant

claims it represented only that "extensive repairs" had been made.
Briggs Aff. f 7.
According to plaintiff's evidence, Briggs told Smalley that
the building

had been completely

re-roofed, that

a five year

warranty had been issued on the (new) roof, that Briggs was in
possession of the warranty, and that he intended to include it in
the sale. Brief of Appellant at 19-20.

Thus, plaintiff understood

that it was buying a building with a new roof under existing
6

warranty for any damage that might occur within a five year term.
These

representations

clearly

involve

presently

existing

facts, since the work on the roof was represented as having been
completed in the recent past.

Smalley Aff. 5 4.

The evidence is

material, since there is a significant economic difference between
a building with a new roof under warranty and a building with a
merely

repaired

accepted

roof not under warranty.

as true

for purposes

of

appellate

Such evidence when
review,

satisfies

plaintiff's burden of producing evidence under either standard of
proof.
Defendant attempts to meet this difficulty by attacking the
evidentiary sufficiency of plaintiff's counter-affidavit for the
first time on appeal.
accepted

principles

Brief of Appellee at 12-13.
of

appellate

According to

review, however,

defendant's

failure to move to strike plaintiff's counter-affidavit

or to

object at oral argument on its motion for summary judgment results
in a waiver of the right to object on evidentiary grounds now.
Litster v. Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933, 936 n. 2
(Utah App. 1994).
true

on

appeal

Thus plaintiff's evidence must be accepted as
and

plaintiff

inferences drawn therefrom.

is

entitled

to

all

Id.; GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873

P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah App. 1994).
2.

reasonable

Future Performance Issue.

Defendant continues to assert that:
Utah case authority clearly holds
that
misrepresentation
of
intended
future
performance is not a "presently existing fact"
upon which a claim for fraud can be based.
7

Republic Group v. Won-Door Corp., 247 U.A.R.
31 (Sept. 1994); Andalex Resources v. Myers,
871 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994).
Brief of Appellee at 12.
Unfortunately, defendant neglects to mention the rest of the
rule.

A complete statement of the rule is as follows:
A
misrepresentation
of
intended
future
performance is not a "presently existing fact"
upon which a claim for fraud can be based
unless a plaintiff
can prove that the
representor,
at
the
time
of
the
representation, did not intend to perform the
promise and made the representation for the
purpose of deceiving the promisee.

Andalex Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d at 1047 (emphasis

added).

Accord Republic Group v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah
App. 1994).
In this case, plaintiff intends to prove that defendant's
agent, at the time the representation was made, did not intend to
perform the promise and made the representation for the purpose of
deceiving Pam Joy.

Since this evidence bears on the element of

scienter, it will be discussed under that point below.
B.

Evidence of Intent to Deceive.

Plaintiff

produced

the

following

evidence

of

defendant's

intent to deceive by counter-affidavit:
4.
In
connection
with
Pam
Joy's
negotiations to purchase the Property, I had
several conversations with Briggs about Pam
Joy's need to receive a standard commercial
five-year warranty for the roof of the
building (the "building") on the Property.
The Warranty would cover both labor and
materials and would exclude only damage caused
by the owner or his agents, and any damage
resulting from mechanical or heating / air
conditioning or ventilation systems operation
8

or malfunction (the "Warranty").
Briggs as
the representative for 5900 Associates, told
me that 5900 Associates had such a Warranty as
a result of having recently re-roofed the
entire
Building.
Briggs
promised
to
immediately provide me with the Warranty.
5.
In addition, on at least one
occasion I made a request in writing for the
Warranty for the roof of the Building. A true
and correct copy of this writing dated April
22, 1993 is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
5900 Associates responded in writing on april
28, 1993 that the request was "acceptable". A
true and correct copy of that response is
attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
6.
On
several
occasions
Briggs
represented to me that the roof of the
Building had been completely re-roofed by
Layton Roofing and that Layton had given 5900
Associates a Warranty for the roof for a
period of five years as part of its roofing
contract.
7.
Briggs further stated to me that the
Warranty would be assigned to Pam Joy in
connection with the Pam Joy's purchase of the
Property.
8.
All of these representations by
Briggs took place prior to the sale of the
Property.
As representative for Pam Joy, I
and
Pam
Joy
relied
upon
Briggs'
representations that the Warranty would be
delivered.
I would not have proceeded to
close the purchase of the Property without
Briggs' representations that the Warranty
would be delivered to Pam Joy.
9.
In
reliance
upon
Briggs'
representation that the Warranty would be
assigned to Pam Joy as part of its purchase of
the Property, Pam Joy proceeded to close its
purchase of the Property on or about June 28,
1993.
10. The Warranty was not delivered at
the closing of the sale of the Property.
Smalley Aff., 55 4-10 (emphasis added).
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By contrast, defendant's affidavit contains the following
statements:
1.
5900 Associates, L.C. is a duly
organized limited liability company. Affiant
is, and during all material times herein, was
the manager of this company.
2.
Prior to June
30, 1993, 5900
Associates, L.C. owned an office building in
Murray, Utah located at 201 East 5900 South
Street.
3.
On June
30, 1993, the
office
building was sold to Pam Joy Realty. Affiant
understood
Pam Joy to be a California
corporation.
4.
From the standpoint of the seller,
affiant handled all of the negotiations for
the sale. No other owner of 5900 Associates,
L.C. participated in any sales negotiating.
7.
Prior to June of 1993, Lay ton
Roofing Company had made extensive roof
repairs to the building. This information was
disclosed
to buyer's
agents
along with
numerous other unrelated verbal discussions.
Affiant at one time told buyer's agent that he
thought a roof warranty could be obtained from
Layton Roofing, although this was never an
item that was followed up or incorporated into
the sales agreement, and it was never
affiant's
intention to have this as a
condition of the sales contract.
Affiant
thereafter had detailed discussions with Alan
Smalley and Steven Sorenson, agents of the
plaintiff, about repairs and warranty items
and such discussions culminated in paragraphs
1, 2 and 3 of the final contract.
Briggs Aff. 55 1-4, 7 (emphasis added).
According

to

plaintiff's

evidence,

Briggs

unequivocally

represented to Smalley that an existing roof warranty "would be
assigned to Pam Joy in connection with the Pam Joy's purchase of
the property."

Smalley Aff. 5 7.
10

But, Briggs himself states that

he never intended to include a roof warranty as a condition of the
sales contract.

Briggs Aff. fl 7.

Finally, it is uncontroverted

that no warranty was ever delivered.
Thus, assuming plaintiff's evidence to be truef it may be
inferred that a representation was made which the promisor at the
time (or at any time) did not intend to perform.

Furthermore,

since the warranty did not even exist, and Briggs was in a superior
position

to

know

that,

it

may

also

be

inferred

that

the

representation was made for the purpose of deceiving the plaintiff
promisee, or at least made recklessly without sufficient knowledge
to justify it.

See Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980).

When, as here, extrinsic evidence of a party's intent is
disputed,

then

a material

judgment cannot be granted.
(Utah App. 1994).

fact

is

also

disputed

and

summary

Records v. Briaas, 887 P.2d 864, 871

In addition, the credibility of such evidence

often turns on a party's demeanor which cannot be fairly judged in
the absence of a trial.

It is generally observed, therefore, that

courts should be cautious in granting a motion for summary judgment
when

resolution

of

the

dispositive

issue

necessitates

determination of one of the parties' state of mind.

a

Credit Union

of America v. Myers, 676 P.2d 99, 106 (Kan. 1984).
C.

Evidence of Reasonable Reliance and Damages.

The

remaining

two

points

in

defendant's

argument

on

plaintiff's fraud claim essentially raise legal issues about the
proper scope of this Court's opinion in Maack v. Resource Design
and Construction Inc. , 875 P. 2d 570 (Utah App. 1994) and the proper
11

measure

of

damages.

These

points

have

been

addressed

in

plaintiff's principal brief and need no repetition here.
III.
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE OF MISTAKE IS LEGALLY
SUFFICIENT TO WITHSTAND DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The

remaining

legal

and

evidentiary

issues

presented

in

defendant's argument on reformation of contract have also been
addressed in plaintiff's principal brief. In addition, plaintiff's
arguments on the standard of proof contained in Point I herein are
equally applicable here.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has met its burden of producing evidence which is
legally sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for summary
judgment on plaintiff's fraud and contract reformation claims. The
summary judgment entered in favor of defendant on these claims
should therefore be reversed and the case remanded to the trial
court for resolution of the disputed issues of material fact.
DATED this 7th day of June, 1995.
Respectfully submitted,
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR

By:_G_
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq.
G. Richard Hill, Esq.
J. Mark Gibb, Esq.
50 South Main Street, # 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Appellant
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